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Strategic Responses to Power Dominance in Buyer-
Supplier Relationships: A Weaker Actor’s Perspective 
 
Abstract 
Purpose – This paper identifies the strategic options available to a weaker actor to counteract 
the dominance of a stronger actor in a buyer-supplier relationship, and identifies those factors 
that influence the choice of individual options. 
Design/methodology/approach – Following a systematic literature review methodology, a 
five-phase approach of planning, searching, screening, extraction and synthesis was 
rigorously employed.  48 studies were used to draw conclusions about the phenomena of 
interest.  
Findings – Captured in an integrated conceptual framework, this study identified five 
strategic options available to the weaker actor in order to counteract a power dominance of a 
stronger player, which were underpinned by seven influencing factors. 
Research limitations/implications – The proposed conceptual framework requires first 
qualitative empirical validation using an abductive multi-case strategy, followed by a theory 
testing phase, employing a configurational approach. 
Practical implications – The proposed framework suggested that the weaker actor in a 
buyer-supplier relationship has five options to address power dominance. These options were 
available within as well as beyond a focal dyadic relationship. For the stronger actor, we 
showed that power dominance is a temporary state rather than permanent. 
Originality/value – This study marks one of the first attempts to present a coherent set of 
strategic options and underpinning factors to counteract power dominance in a buyer-supplier 
relationship from the perspective of a weaker actor. Given the underexplored nature of the 
topic, the study also provides guidelines for further research.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Power imbalance between buyers and suppliers is one of the defining characteristics of any 
supply network (Bastl, et al., 2013).  Existing studies have focused mainly on more powerful 
actors that control and influence behaviours and exchanges in buyer-supplier relationships. 
These have investigated the role of trust and power (Benton and Maloni, 2005), the role of 
bargaining power (Crook and Combs, 2007), relationship commitment and power (Zhao et 
al., 2008) and how a buying company exerts power to influence the relationship between 
suppliers (Wu et al., 2010). 
Here we draw attention to the dilemma of the weaker actor in a buyer-supplier relationship in 
how to respond to the power dominance of the stronger actor. Firms in supply chains seek to 
control each other, mostly over the possession and access to critical resources (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978). The dominance of one actor over another is a function of relative 
dependence - i.e. the difference between a firm’s dependence on its partner and its partner’s 
dependence on the firm (Anderson and Narus, 1990). The primary consequence of relative 
dependence is indicated as power (Caniels and Gelderman, 2007). Dominant firms in supply 
chains are not only able to create dependent suppliers (Cox, 1999), but they will actually seek 
to attain a dominant position (Cox, 2001). This need for dominance and tendency to control 
exists in all tiers of supply chains and it is an issue that requires firms’ constant attention in 
order to effectively manage inter-firm relationships.  
Nevertheless power imbalance in buyer-supplier relationship does not automatically imply 
difficulties between the weaker and stronger actor. Power can provide an effective 
coordination of exchange relationships as the distribution of power becomes legitimate over 
time (Maloni and Benton, 2000). In these buyer-supplier relationships both actors invest in 
developing strong long-term partnerships based on their individual and/or joint motivations 
(e.g. entering new markets (Akpinar and Zettinig, 2008) or developing new products based on 
joint research (Anderson et al., 1994)). However the issues arise when the stronger actor 
misuses and exploits its power position in a way that it goes against the weaker actor’s 
business objectives (Caniels and Gelderman, 2007). This can lead to unproductive 
relationships (Bobot, 2010) resulting in the erosion of any benefit that the weaker actor may 
possess and consequently cause permanent damage to a relationship (Gulati, et al., 2008).  
From a weaker actor’s perspective, these situations require an answer to the strategic question 
“what to do”? For example, how can a weaker supplier deal with a powerful buyer who 
demands year on year price reductions, which could result in the supplier’s bankruptcy? Or 
what can a weaker buyer do when a dominant supplier dictates unreasonable customer 
service levels and controls pricing policies? Using a systematic literature review 
methodology, we bring together a fragmented body of literature shedding light on these 
dilemmas in an under explored context (Bastl et al., 2013).  
With this study we make two contributions: First, the study is a first attempt to present 
coherent insights into what options are available to a weaker player, either buyer or supplier, 
to counteract the power dominance of a stronger actor in a buyer-supplier relationship. Most 
options (collaboration, compromise, diversification and coalition building) result in 
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continuation of the focal relationship. The other option (exit) brings a focal buyer-supplier 
relationship to an end. Second, this study showed that the choice of a particular strategic 
option is influenced by seven underpinning factors that exist at the dyadic and network levels. 
Both strategic options and the underpinning factors are captured in an integrated conceptual 
framework.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: a description of the systematic literature 
review methodology is followed by descriptive and thematic findings. The thematic findings 
first identify the strategic options, and then those factors that influence the choice of options. 
We then discuss the study’s theoretical and practical contributions and finally close with 
agenda for further research. 
2. METHODOLOGY 
In seeking to address field problems (i.e. problems of significance to managers, Denyer et al., 
2008) we adopt a systematic literature review methodology (Tranfield et al., 2003), in which 
there is a comprehensive search for relevant studies on a specific topic, which are then 
appraised and synthesized according to a pre-determined explicit method (Klassen et al., 
1998). Providing comprehensive coverage of the literature and ensuring comparability for 
repeated future searches, this method follows a series of ten steps that can be grouped into 
five main phases (Planning, Searching, Screening, Extraction, Synthesis including 
Reporting). 
In the planning phase through discussion with colleagues the authors defined the review 
question as: 
1. “What are the options available to a weaker actor to counteract the dominance of a 
stronger actor in a buyer-supplier relationship?” 
This suggested an important additional question: 
2. “What influences the choice of strategic options available to a weaker actor to 
counteract the dominance of a stronger actor in a buyer-supplier relationship?” 
These two questions were addressed following the search process outlined by Tranfield et al. 
(2003). Relevant literature found in a variety of disciplines (including marketing, supply 
chain, strategy and organisational behaviour) was identified through: 
 Keywords used in the different literature streams. These keywords were later used to 
build search strings which were applied to two bibliographic databases (Web of 
Knowledge and Scopus) and three content databases (EBSCO, Proquest and Wiley-
Blackwell). 
 The review of references in relevant articles identified by the keyword search. 
Together these two approaches identified 10,223 items. 
 Discovering influential authors in the field (e.g. Cox, Caniels and Pressey) and 
examining their publications. An additional ten articles resulted. 
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 Conversation with colleagues and ad hoc searching resulted in the addition of 13 
articles. 
The specification of the search terms (Table 1) aimed to generate a list of articles that would 
be “both wide enough to recall a sufficient quantity of references and precise enough, in the 
light of information explosion, to eliminate unnecessary material” (Duff, 1996, p.15). The 
selected keywords were then used to construct search strings with Boolean connectors (AND, 
OR, AND NOT). 
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
The string was used to search five databases for titles and abstracts of scholarly articles 
published between January 1980 and December 2012. After the removal of duplicates from 
the items generated by the databases, 4760 articles were identified. The title and abstract of 
these articles were then screened against a set of pre-determined inclusion and exclusion 
criteria (Table 2). 4192 articles were rejected principally because they focused on whole 
networks rather than dyads. The remaining 568 articles plus the 23 items identified by other 
means were then read in full and subject to the same inclusion and exclusion criteria.  A 
further 509 articles were rejected because they did not clearly identify a weaker actor. The 
remaining 82 papers were screened according to pre-determined quality criteria covering 
alignment between research questions, chosen methods, execution of the research and 
methodological rigour (Miles and Huberman, 1994). 34 articles were rejected; leaving 48 
studies (see Appendix A) that focused on the buyer-supplier relationship at a dyadic level and 
clearly identified a weaker actor.  
 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
The content of each paper was extracted and recorded on a spread-sheet organized under 
descriptive, methodological and thematic categories. Specifically this identified the weaker 
actor and the perspective adopted in the paper, which could be supplier, buyer or both. The 
identification of these actors and the perspective was cross-validated by the three authors in 
an iterative fashion until agreement was reached on final classification; a practice adopted in 
other literature reviews (Armstrong et al., 2012). A list of five discrete options available to 
the weaker actor operating either within the dyad or beyond emerged inductively; a practice 
adopted in other literature reviews (Müller-Seitz, 2012). According to their particular focus, 
papers were then allocated to these option categories; some were allocated to more than one 
category because they considered more than one option. Cross-validation by the three authors 
ensured agreement. Similarly a list of seven factors that influenced the choice of individual 
strategic options inductively emerged from the analysis. Based on frequency of occurrence of 
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each factor in the reviewed papers and a qualitative assessment of the conceptual clarity of 
each factor the initial list of 36 was collapsed into seven factors after discussion amongst the 
three authors. This aggregation process was cross-validated by the authors until agreement 
was reached.  
There are a number of alternative approaches to synthesis when reviewing literature 
systematically. Heterogeneous data, which form the basis of this review, are not amenable to 
aggregative synthesis methods (Rousseau et al., 2008), but more amenable to interpretive and 
explanatory synthesis which extract descriptive data and exemplars from individual studies to 
provide a feasible explanation and answer to the review question (Denyer et al., 2008). Here 
we report the findings in response to each of the questions separately before considering in 
the discussion how these may be integrated. A summary of the systematic selection process is 
presented in Figure 1. 
 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
 
3. DESCRIPTIVE FINDINGS 
We now summarize the descriptive findings from the literature review and reflect on these 
later in the agenda for further research. Table 3 allocates papers to different descriptive 
categories. The literature is a mixture of analytical (9) and empirical (39) papers utilizing 
predominantly quantitative methods (25). Although issues of power imbalance affect both 
actors in a buyer-supplier relationship, researchers mainly focus on one side only. From 48 
studies, only 16 adopted a dyadic perspective (e.g. Pressey and Qiu, 2007; Wyld et al., 2012). 
Different studies identified different weaker actors: 15 studied suppliers, 14 studied buyers, 
eight studied both, and 16 studies explored situations where an actor is in a weaker position 
in one relationship yet simultaneously a stronger player in another relationship (e.g. Caniels 
and Gelderman, 2007; Bobot, 2010). 
 
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
Table 4 identifies which papers consider a particular strategic option or influencing factor.  
Some papers explored multiple options and factors. Collaboration was the most frequently 
considered of the five options (e.g. Mukherji and Francis, 2008; Schmoltzi and Wu, 2012). 
Papers were more uniformly allocated to the seven influencing factors, although there was a 
preponderance of studies exploring interdependence and conflict. 
 
Insert Table 4 about here 
6 
 
 
4. THEMATIC FINDINGS 
In the first part of this section we identify the strategic options available to a weaker actor to 
counteract the dominance of a stronger actor in a buyer-supplier relationship, addressing 
review question 1. In the second part we answer review question 2 identifying those factors 
that influence the weaker actor’s choice of strategic option. 
 
 Question 1: Strategic options for counteracting dominance 
From our analysis of the literature five strategic options emerged, which were available to the 
weaker actor to counteract the stronger actor’s dominance. The options were: 1) 
collaboration; 2) compromise; 3) diversification; 4) coalition, 5) exit. An examination of the 
properties of these five options revealed that they fall into one of three categories: a) exiting 
the relationship; b) addressing the dominance of the stronger actor and continuing with the 
existing relationship; or c) addressing the dominance of the stronger actor by reaching out 
into the network of relationships in which the focal buyer-supplier relationship is embedded. 
These categories are defined by whether the relationship will continue or end, and whether 
the dominance is addressed within or beyond the focal dyad, i.e. at the dyadic or network 
level. The categorization of the five strategic options is illustrated in Figure 2. Given the 
possibility of responding at either a dyadic or a network level, we differentiated collaboration 
between these two levels, although we discuss it as a single option. 
 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
 
4.1.1 Collaboration 
The first strategic option for the weaker actor to counteract the dominance of a strong actor 
was collaboration (Schmoltzi and Wu, 2012). Collaboration encourages the pursuit of a 
solution that fully satisfies the concerns of both actors (Thomas, 1992). By adopting this 
strategy a weaker actor attempts to counterbalance the power dominance by enhancing the 
importance of its resources for the stronger actor (Caniels et al., 2010). A weaker actor can 
achieve this objective by collaborating either within a focal dyad (i.e. dyadic collaboration) or 
at the network level (i.e. network collaboration) (Wyld et al., 2012). The objective of both 
types of collaboration is the same - to enhance the importance of a weaker actor’s resources 
for the stronger actor – only the means are different. 
An example from the US automotive industry illustrates how weaker players are able to 
address power asymmetry through collaboration within the dyad (Akpinar and Zettinig, 
2008). While dealing with powerful automobile manufacturers, an automobile parts supplier 
(weaker actor) adopted an innovation-driven growth strategy to increase the importance of its 
resources. The weaker actor reinvested at least 7% of its before-tax profit for research and 
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development to regularly introduce patented innovations, which resulted in annual sales 
growth of more than 20% for over a decade. In doing so the weaker actor changed the nature 
of the interdependence between the firms from a transactional to a collaborative one.  
However, there are situations when a weaker actor does not possess all the necessary 
resources to develop a collaborative relationship within the focal dyad (Cai and Yang, 2008). 
In such situations the weaker actor could tie itself more closely to the stronger actor in the 
focal relationship as well as other actors present in the network that possess the required 
resources (Mukherji and Francis, 2008), i.e. display network collaboration. Anderson et al. 
(1994) present an example from the Danish printing industry where a small label printer 
(weaker actor) simultaneously used collaborative relationships both within and outside the 
focal relationship to improve its power position with the stronger actor (a large beverage 
producer). For the label printer, this relationship was important not only because of the sales 
volume involved but also because of the status and legitimacy gained by association with the 
beverage producer. The closure of the factory supplying paper to the printer risked 
jeopardizing the relationship between the label printer and the beverage company. In 
response, the printer initiated a collaborative product development program between the 
beverage producer and a different paper manufacturer resulting in the development of 
alternative label paper. This improved the printer’s power position in the relationship with the 
beverage producer by strengthening its reputation as a capable and reliable partner for the 
future.  
 
4.1.2 Compromise 
The second strategic option for the weaker actor to continue the relationship within the dyad 
was compromise (Hausman and Johnston, 2010). The objective of compromise is to find a 
quick and mutually agreeable solution that partially satisfies everyone in the hope of gaining 
mutual benefits in the future from continuing the relationship (Bobot, 2010). The weak 
actor’s decision to compromise is influenced by the extent to which it feels powerless in a 
buyer-supplier relationship (Cox et al., 2004) simply accepting the prevailing power 
asymmetry in the relationship (Hausman and Johnston, 2010). Compromise is identified 
typically with statements such as “splitting the difference,” “exchanging concessions,” or 
“seeking the middle ground" (Caniels and Gelderman, 2005). 
This strategic option occurs when the weaker actor is subjected to unfavourable conditions by 
the stronger actor (e.g. inflexible contracts) and has no choice but to accept the status quo if it 
wants the relationship with the stronger actor to continue (Gelderman et al., 2008). In 
monopolistic markets for example weaker actors are often left with no choice but to 
compromise when dealing with a stronger actor. Caniels and Gelderman (2005) illustrated 
this using the Dutch natural gas market.  A monopolistic supplier forced its buyers (weaker 
actors) to comply with the strict contractual terms and conditions. In cases of non-
compliance, the dominant supplier made it impossible for the buying organization to continue 
doing business as usual. As the dominant supplier had the power to execute the threats, with 
generally large financial penalties, the weaker buyers had no option but to sign and comply 
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with a detailed and inflexible contract, thereby accepting the existing power imbalance in the 
focal relationship. 
 
4.1.3 Diversification 
The third strategic option available to a weaker actor was diversification (Bruyaka and 
Durand, 2012). Diversification indicates a weaker actor’s intent to establish one or more 
long-term relationships beyond the dyad without actually damaging the focal relationship 
with the stronger actor (Anderson and Jap, 2005). This option allows the weaker actor to 
neutralize the power dominance of the stronger actor by engaging with alternative business 
partners thereby minimizing its reliance on the specific partner (Mukherji and Francis, 2008). 
For example, suppliers in the traditionally buyer-dominated US automotive industry 
(Handley and Benton, 2012b) may adopt diversification strategies. By entering new markets 
suppliers increase their number of buyers, and so reduce their dependence on any single 
buyer and conversely increase their power in that particular relationship (Handley and 
Benton, 2012a). Moreover, pursuing related diversification enabled suppliers to improve the 
cumulative importance of their resources by becoming system’s integrators (Akpinar and 
Zettinig, 2008).  
While diversification brings more visibility and legitimacy to the weaker actor it also 
increased the costs involved in managing time and resource requirements of partners in a 
more diverse portfolio of relationships (Helm et al., 2006). These costs may affect the 
survival of the weaker actor as Bruyaka and Durand (2012) showed in the French 
biotechnological industry. Dealing with a portfolio of powerful partners requires smaller (less 
powerful) organizations to balance diverse interests and goals (Wyld et al., 2012). This places 
considerable strain on the resources and capabilities of smaller organizations.  Weaker actors 
should be self-critical evaluating the costs and benefits of diversification before forming 
relationships with stronger actors (Lindgreen and Pels, 2002). 
 
4.1.4 Coalition 
Coalition building with others beyond the focal dyad was the fourth strategic option (Choi 
and Linton, 2011). Coalition is a temporary, means-oriented alliance among players with 
different goals and is distinctly different from collaborative alliances formed through 
diversification. Coalitions have a short–term focus and can take place between two 
competing actors – e.g. two suppliers or two buyers (Bastl et al., 2013). A typical coalition 
relationship is usually informal, non-contractual and less enduring as opposed to long-term 
strategic alliances that are formalized and where actors pursue goals which are aligned with 
the goals of allies (Bastl et al., 2013). 
The case of LG Electronics (Choi and Linton, 2011) represents an example of coalition 
building to counteract the dominance of a stronger player.  LGE established an informal 
coalition relationship with TSMC of Taiwan, and a supplier to Qualcomm. This coalition was 
being used to leverage the stronger actor (Qualcomm) for more favourable delivery terms. 
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4.1.5 Exit 
The fifth strategic option available to the weaker actor was exit (Gulati et al., 2008). Exit 
indicates the weaker actor’s willingness to terminate the existing relationship (Hirschman, 
1970) and occurs when the expected costs of staying in the relationship outweigh the benefits 
(Gulati, et al., 2008). It describes a situation where one actor no longer views the relationship 
with another actor as continuing, and where the interdependency between them has ended. By 
exiting from a relationship, a weaker actor breaks the links (exchange of goods, personal 
relationships, contracts, bonds of trust, and commitment) with its powerful counterpart 
(Tahtinen, 2002). It represents the ultimate and most destructive response to power imbalance 
in a buyer-supplier relationship (Tjemkes and Furrer, 2010), where the focus is towards 
changing the partner instead of improving the existing relationship (Alajoutsijarvi et al., 
2000).  
However, not all exits are the same. The analysis of the literature identified 4 types of exit 
strategies: silent, communicated, negotiated and disguised. Silent exit occurs when the weaker 
actor has no need to communicate its exit wishes to its stronger partner (Pressey and 
Mathews, 2003). Silent exit is often observed in project-based relationships with an accepted 
finite life (Alajoutsijarvi, et al., 2000). In such situations the weaker actor can silently exit 
from a relationship once the pre-determined relationship ending date is reached. 
Communicated exit is a second type of exit and occurs when the weaker actor informs the 
dominant partner about its inability or unwillingness to continue an unsatisfactory 
relationship. This can lead to hostility and a largely irrevocable breakdown in the 
relationship. A clothing firm (weaker actor) in the US apparel industry had been given the 
license to sell the products by a clothes manufacturer (stronger actor) in the US market. The 
clothes manufacturer failed in its relationships with another subsidiary of the clothing firm in 
Canada. As a consequence, the US clothing firm communicated to the clothing manufacturer 
that “the contract has expired, we’re not doing business with you anymore” (Pressey and 
Mathews, 2003; p.146). Negotiated Exit is an option where the weaker actor negotiates 
without hostility or argument with the stronger actor about relationship disengagement. Both 
partners acknowledge that disengagement is inevitable and can therefore discuss the matter 
with mutual understanding (Alajoutsijarvi et al., 2000). Lastly disguised exit occurs when a 
weaker actor does not directly indicate to the stronger actor a desire to exit the relationship 
but nevertheless creates a situation where the relationship becomes unsustainable. This 
indirect approach may take the form of a supplier deliberately increasing the input costs or a 
buyer not fulfilling its payment obligations on time (Alajoutsijarvi et al., 2000). In the US 
automotive industry Bendix (weaker actor) worked with Ford (stronger actor) to design 
brakes. Ford reneged several times on implicit commitments to Bendix, for example by 
sourcing the production of brakes designed by Bendix to a different, cheaper firm. Fear that 
Ford would renege again caused Bendix to demand extremely fast paybacks on its 
relationship specific automobile investments with Ford, thereby ensuring that the relationship 
ended (Pressey and Mathews, 2003). 
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4.2 Question 2: Underpinning factors affecting strategic choice 
From the analysis of the literature, seven underpinning factors emerged that influence the 
choice of strategic options available to the weaker actor to counteract the dominance of the 
stronger actor.  These factors were: 1) nature of interdependence; 2) relationship governance; 
3) sources of power; 4) switching cost; 5) type of conflict; 6) relationship closeness; and 7) 
available alternatives. In this section we introduce each underpinning factor and show how 
they may affect the weaker actor’s choice of strategic options either at the dyadic or network 
level (see Figure 3). 
 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
 
4.2.1 Nature of Interdependence 
The nature of interdependence may influence the choice of a strategic option. As Caniels and 
Gelderman (2007) stated (p. 220) “firms always depend, to varying extents, on their trading 
partner”. Dependence has been described as a firm’s need to maintain a relationship with the 
partner to achieve its goals (Frazier and Summers, 1984). A high level of interdependence is 
an indicator of an intense, strong, often cooperative, and long-term relationship between two 
actors. However, interdependence between two trading actors is rarely completely symmetric. 
Rather it is asymmetric - known also as relative dependence - and defined as the difference in 
level of dependence of the two participating actors (Anderson and Narus, 1990). Relative 
dependence results in power differences in a buyer-supplier relationship, or as Pfeffer and 
Salancik (1978) posited, if actor A depends on actor B’s resources more than B depends on 
A’s resources, then B has power over A.  
From a weaker actor’s perspective, the level of importance of its resources for the strong 
actor improves its relative power position. The importance of its resources increases the more 
these resources exhibit VRIN properties (Barney, 1991). For example, in the US retail sector 
weak retailers were successful in counteracting the dominance of Wal-Mart (stronger actor) 
only when they were proactive in enhancing the importance of their resources through brand 
equity; market knowledge and granting of certain concessions. As a result these retailers 
established collaborative long-term relationships with Wal-Mart, which acted as an entry 
barrier for other competitors. On the other hand, weak retailers which remained passive and 
did not possess, or were unable to develop, resources with VRIN characteristics, had no 
choice but to compromise and comply with the strict terms and conditions set by Wal-Mart 
(Bloom and Perry, 2001). 
 
4.2.2 Relationship Governance  
Relationship governance refers to institutional instruments or formal and informal 
mechanisms that buyers and suppliers put in place as safeguards to enable them to establish, 
structure, and govern inter-firm exchanges (Pilbeam et al., 2012).   
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Relationship governance influences the choice of strategic options available to a weaker actor 
to counteract the dominance of the stronger actor. For instance, the design of formal contracts 
can influence exit pathways which maybe either symmetric (equally easy or difficult exit for 
both partners) or asymmetric (easy exit for one and difficult exit for the other partner) (Gulati 
et al., 2008). “Difficult” exit could be advantageous because it makes partners more likely to 
remain dedicated to the relationship during rough times, and to build trust and a deeper 
commitment in general. In such situations, the weaker actor negotiates the terms and 
conditions to end the relationship with its stronger actor. In comparison, “easy” exit brings 
flexibility with regard to strategic decision making and resource allocation (Harrison, 2004). 
For example, “easy” exit provides the weaker actor with an opportunity to disengage from the 
unsatisfactory relationship silently, in disguised form, or by communicating its intentions to 
its stronger partner (Pressey and Qiu, 2007). 
Because of their flexible nature, informal relationship governance can persuade weaker actors 
to accept the power dominance of the stronger actor and develop a long-term relationship 
(Wu et al., 2010). However, informal relationship governance does not provide the 
mechanisms necessary to safeguard any investments made by the weaker actor in the focal 
relationship. For example, with no formal contracts in place, a US-based paint manufacturer 
(weaker actor) had to file for bankruptcy once its stronger partner - a powerful Japanese car 
manufacturer - decided to exit the relationship without any prior notice (Gulati et al., 2008). 
 
4.2.3 Sources of Power 
Different sources of power in a buyer-supplier relationship influence the choice of strategic 
option. Power may be either mediated (reward; coercion and legal legitimate based on formal 
contracts), or non-mediated (referent; expert; and traditional legitimate) (French and Raven, 
1959). Mediated power represents competitive and negative uses of power while non-
mediated power sources are more relational and positive in orientation (Benton and Maloni, 
2005). While exercising mediated power, a stronger actor typically applies coercive tactics 
(e.g. financial penalties) on the weaker actor, whereas no such tactics are applied in the use of 
non-mediated power (Maloni and Benton, 2000). For example, in the Dutch public-utility 
sector, suppliers (stronger actor) used both reward and coercive tactics to control the payment 
behaviour of their buyers (weaker actor). In this situation, the weaker actor was left with the 
choice of either compromising and continuing the relationship by accepting the existing 
power imbalance or discontinuing the relationship and finding an alternate source of energy 
(Gelderman et al., 2008). 
In contrast, the use of non-mediated power in the Japanese automotive industry allowed the 
development of long-term partnerships. Encouraged by the positive relationship building 
approach of their stronger partners like Chrysler and Honda, the weaker suppliers attempted 
to establish close ties by participating in joint new product development initiatives. This 
approach enabled the weaker suppliers to gain access to industry intelligence created by these 
collaborative business relationships. Because of the importance of this newly acquired skill, 
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the weaker actors were able to shift the power imbalance in their favour (Maloni and Benton, 
2000). 
 
4.2.4 Switching Costs 
The fourth underpinning factor was switching costs. Switching costs refer to the difficulties 
or costs associated with changing a firm’s current trading partner. There are two types of 
switching costs: a) break-off costs, which form a barrier to ending old business relationships, 
and b) set-up costs, which form a barrier to engaging in new business relationships (Harrison, 
2004). When deciding whether to continue with the same partner or terminate the 
relationship, the weaker actor has to consider the various costs (e.g. legal costs) of shifting 
from one partner to another. Higher switching costs increase the dependency of a weaker 
actor in the relationship, resulting in a widening of the power differential between actors in 
the relationship. Switching costs are typically either relationship specific assets (Pressey and 
Mathews, 2003) or legal costs (Rossetti and Choi, 2008). 
Relationship specific assets refer to those investments that are sunk costs and that cannot be 
redeployed easily to another relationship without some sacrifice in the productivity of the 
assets or some cost incurred in adapting them to the new context (Anderson and Jap, 2005). 
Such investments make it difficult for the weaker actor to switch partners (Harrison, 2004) 
thereby encouraging it to either collaborate to improve its power position in the relationship 
or to accept the status quo by compromising and complying with the terms and conditions set 
by the stronger actor.  
Harrison (2004) chronicled the evolution of the relationship between a UK clothing 
manufacturer (William Baird) and a large UK retailer (Marks and Spencer – M&S) from its 
beginning in 1969. At that time William Baird had business contracts with several large UK 
retailers. However, by 1995 William Baird had adapted its assets to a degree that it could 
only supply M&S and was highly dependent upon it. When M&S began to reduce its 
dependence on UK manufacturers in 1999 due to poor trading performance, William Baird 
was compromised because of its relationship specific assessments. It had no option but to 
comply with M&S’s wishes and continue the relationship at much lower business volumes. 
Legal Costs: When considering changing partners a weaker actor needs to consider the 
probable legal costs involved in switching. Violating contractual obligations may incur heavy 
legal costs. Rossetti and Choi (2008) provided examples of copyright infringements from the 
US aerospace industry. Boeing (a strong actor) sued Sierracin (their weaker supplier) when it 
was successfully proved that the supplier was unable to design windows without Boeing’s 
copyrighted drawings. Similarly, a protracted battle between United Technologies 
Corporation (UTC) and Chromalloy involved law suits and counter law suits with each side 
alleging damages. The costs of defence and loss of reputation for the weaker supplier were 
large. 
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4.2.5 Type of Conflict 
Conflict in a buyer-supplier relationship is defined as the disagreements between the two 
partners regarding the tasks being performed. Conflicts between buyers and suppliers take 
two forms: 
Functional conflict occurs when actors have different viewpoints (Bobot, 2010). Functional 
conflict may produce positive as well as the more frequently anticipated negative outcomes. 
Positive outcomes arise because functional conflict allows buyers and suppliers to identify 
and discuss alternative perspectives, enabling the efficient removal of impediments and 
enhancing the prospect of a long-term relationship. A Swedish saw-equipment producer 
overcame a source of contention with a large saw mill, and strengthened its ties with the same 
mill by collaborating on a joint program to develop specialized saws that cut frozen timber. 
As a result of this initiative, both partners successfully overcame this functional conflict by 
developing the required equipment through technical collaboration (Anderson et al., 1994). 
Dysfunctional conflict arising from dysfunctional behaviors, dissatisfaction, and poor 
individual or group performance produces tension and antagonism, and distracts people from 
their task performance (Bobot, 2010). While facing a dysfunctional conflict, a weaker actor 
can opt to exit the relationship in order to counteract the dominance of the stronger actor. In 
response to a buyer (strong actor) who habitually switched suppliers to get a better deal, a 
supplier (weak actor) in the UK fashion industry opted to exit the relationship (Pressey and 
Mathews, 2003).  
 
4.2.6 Relationship Closeness 
Relationship closeness, the sixth underpinning factor refers to the level of trust and extent of 
information sharing between the partners in a power asymmetric relationship. Trust is defined 
as the “willingness to rely on an exchange partner in whom one has confidence” (Moorman et 
al, 1993; p. 82). The literature on trust suggests that confidence in one’s partner in a buyer-
supplier relationship results from the established belief that the partner is reliable and will 
perform according to expectations even if it is not monitored or controlled. Levels of trust 
often increase as the duration of a relationship increase, giving rise to sustainable long-term 
benefits (Anderson and Narus, 1990). Relationship specific assets increase the level of trust 
and tend to increase the longevity of the relationship to the benefit of the weaker actor 
(Caniels and Gelderman, 2010).  
Christiansen and Maltz (2002) showed how a weaker actor in the Danish electronics sector 
was able to improve its power position by focusing on the level of closeness with its stronger 
partner. Grundolg Electronics Limited (GEL), recognizing its small size, specialized in 
electromechanical controls for pumps and pump motors and through extensive and prolonged 
face-to-face contact developed a “special” relationship normally reserved for large customers 
with a major electronics supplier (NEC). Using its specialist knowledge, GEL worked in 
collaboration with NEC to develop innovative products. GEL had the patent to use the new 
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technology for its pumps and pump motors while NEC benefited from GEL’s knowledge to 
upgrade its other commercial products. 
Extent of information sharing refers to the level of detail and the frequency of information 
exchanged between the partners (Lindgreen and Pels, 2002). For example, close relationships 
based on information exchange developed between small suppliers (weaker actors) and 
powerful automobile makers (stronger actors) in the Japanese car industry to solve shared 
problems. Higher levels of information sharing and commitment encouraged suppliers to 
make investments enabling improved quality, just-in-time delivery and product and process 
innovation (Helper and Sako, 1991). 
 
4.2.7 Available Alternatives 
The last factor that can influence the choice of a strategic option is the number and quality of 
alternative partners. A greater number and better quality of available alternatives provides the 
weaker actor with the necessary leverage to counteract the power differential (Caniels and 
Gelderman, 2007) by establishing links with other actors outside the focal relationship. In 
such situations a weaker actor can reduce its reliance on a particular partner by managing a 
portfolio of relationships (Caniels and Gelderman, 2010). The greater the number of partners 
a weaker actor (e.g. supplier or a buyer) has (both inside and outside a particular industry), 
the greater is its power in any specific buyer relationship. For example, to counteract the 
dominance of powerful aerospace buyers (stronger actors), a Canadian-based parts 
manufacturer (weaker actor) producing precision instruments for the aerospace industry, 
diversified into the automotive industry (Akpinar and Zettinig, 2008). 
A weaker actor may be forced to compromise where it is difficult to acquire alternative 
resources from outside the focal relationship (Sanderson, 2001). Provan and Gassenheimer 
(1994) reported that in the US office furniture industry market leaders (stronger actors) 
visible to customers could offer a wide variety of products and services, and had a major 
impact on industry structure. Dealers (weaker actors) had few alternative suppliers to choose 
from, and thus, tended to be highly dependent on a single supplier.  Although dealers could 
represent many suppliers, in practice the top suppliers placed strong constraints on which 
alternative suppliers their dealers could represent.  Consequently, dealers generally developed 
close ties with the dominant suppliers. When these top suppliers established long-term, co-
operative ties with individual dealers, the need for actively controlling these particular dealers 
decreased since they were then considered as trusted business partners. 
 
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this review we have focused on the weaker actor in a buyer-supplier context. To date, most 
of the literature on power is written from the perspective of a stronger actor that leads and 
controls a relationship (Benton and Maloni 2005). This work is a first attempt to synthesize 
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the literature, dealing with a weaker actor and consequently we make two primary 
contributions to the literature on power in buyer-supplier relationships.  
First, we identified five strategic options that are available to a weaker actor to counteract a 
dominant stronger actor, namely collaboration, compromise, diversification, coalition and 
exit. This inclusive view contrasts starkly with other work that typically considers these 
options in isolation. The five options differ along three dimensions: a) context in which 
power dominance is addressed – i.e. dyad or network, b) continuation or termination of a 
focal relationship, and c) reasons for the power shift once an individual option is chosen and 
implemented. 
We showed that in spite of the existence of the power dominance in a focal buyer-supplier 
relationship, strategic choices to address this dominance are not limited to a dyadic context. 
While collaboration and compromise would be two typical dyadic strategies, the weaker actor 
should not overlook the fact that its dyadic relationship with a stronger actor is embedded in a 
wider network (Choi and Kim, 2008). Where collaboration or compromise are not viable 
options, the weaker actor can reach beyond the focal dyad into the wider network to engage 
with alternative trading partners through diversification or coalition building. Moreover, the 
identified options do not presuppose that the focal relationship with a stronger actor will 
continue. While four of the choices result in the continuation of the focal relationship 
(although its nature may change), this is not the case for exit. Exit represents the most radical 
option in addressing power dominance. Here the weaker actor focuses on terminating the 
focal relationship. It is noteworthy that not all choices alter power relations in the same way. 
When opting for collaboration for example, the weaker actor attempts to reduce the power 
imbalance by increasing the importance of its resources for the stronger actor, meaning it is 
‘moving’ closer to the stronger actor (Christiansen and Maltz, 2002). In contrast, with options 
such as diversification or coalition building the weaker actor ‘moves’ away from the stronger 
one, as it tries to decrease the importance of the stronger actor’s resources for itself (Bruyaka 
and Durand, 2012).  
Our second contribution lies in the identification of underpinning factors that influence the 
choice of an individual strategic option. The underpinning factors have been previously 
considered in isolation (Pressey and Qiu, 2007), and it is this work that brings them together 
in a unified framework (Figure 3) and shows how they may influence the choice of an 
individual strategic option. We showed that the weaker actor’s choices are influenced by the 
underpinning factors that exist at the dyadic level (i.e. nature of dyadic interdependence, 
relational governance, sources of power, switching costs, type of conflict and relationship 
closeness), and at the network level (i.e. available alternatives and nature of network 
interdependence). While we were able to show in the results that at least one factor influences 
a specific strategic option, we speculate that the interplay between the factors and the choices 
is more complex. Individual options may be influenced by more than one factor and each 
factor may influence more than one strategic choice.  
Our study has important practical implications.  First, we suggest a sequence of decisions 
(Figure 4) that a weak actor can make to select an appropriate option in response to a stronger 
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actor in a buyer-supplier relationship. Each decision is informed by consideration of the 
influencing factors. Second, these alternative scenarios indicate that a weaker actor does have 
options even when in a relationship with a dominant actor who is controlling the relationship 
in ways inimical to the weaker actor’s interests. This has implications for both parties. Strong 
actors in a buyer-supplier relationship should not treat their power positions as permanent but 
rather as temporary, and something that requires continuous attention to maintain. Moreover, 
weak actors need not accept the status quo. 
 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
 
6. AGENDA FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
To advance this work and drawing on both descriptive and thematic findings we suggest a 
number of avenues for further research. Our proposed framework (Figure 3) requires 
empirical validation and we suggest that future investigations may take the following path.  
First, by adopting a qualitative, multi-case study strategy, we suggest the examination and 
validation of the linkages between individual options and underpinning factors. Exposing an 
entire framework to a single field study may prove an overwhelming task and so we suggest 
that the framework is broken into three parts. Researchers could explore links first between 
the underpinning factors and strategic options within a dyad, then between factors and 
options within a network and third, between factors and the exit option. This study would 
greatly benefit from the utilization of an abductive approach, which would allow researchers 
to cycle between theory (i.e. the proposed framework) and empirical data through ‘systematic 
combining’ (cf. Dubois and Gadde, 2002). Abduction allows researchers to anchor their 
findings to an initial theory that is then developed – and possibly extended - through each 
round of data collection and analysis (Kovacs and Spens, 2005).  
Second, to overcome the limitations of the current literature that served as a basis for the 
development of the proposed framework we would encourage researchers to collect data in 
the dyadic context from the perspectives of both weaker and stronger actor, and in the 
network context to collect data from at least three actors – the weaker and stronger actors and 
the weaker actor’s new network partner.   
Third, as a logical continuation in theory development we propose a theory-testing phase. 
The adoption of a configurational approach – i.e. QCA (Qualitative Comparative Analysis) 
and its subset fsQCA (fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis) - would yield valuable 
insights (Ragin, 2008). fsQCA is particularly advantageous in situations with complex 
causality (which we believe the first phase will uncover) and allows for equifinality, where 
multiple solutions can lead to the same outcome. 
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Table 1. Keywords and search terms used in the systematic review 
Buyer  Supplier  Interaction  Not related terms 
Buyer* 
OR 
AND 
Supplier* OR 
AND 
Collaborat* 
OR 
AND 
NOT 
System* OR 
Customer*  Seller OR Advers* OR Multimedia OR 
 Vendor* *depend*OR Computer OR 
  Alliance* OR Health OR 
  Balanc* OR Med* OR 
  Bargain* OR Tech* OR 
  Compl* OR Scien* OR 
  Conflict* OR Consum* 
  Control* OR  
  Cooperat* OR  
  Domina* OR  
  Dyad* OR  
  Power OR  
  Relation*  
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Table 2. Criteria for including and excluding papers in the systematic review 
Criteria Rationale 
Inclusion  
Publications in peer reviewed journals only These are likely to be of higher quality than 
conference papers or working papers etc. 
Publications since 1980 Giunipero et al., (2008) suggest there is 
limited supply chain research before 1980 
Business-to-Business dyadic relationships Focus is on dyadic buyer-supplier 
relationships  
Identifiable weak actor Focus of study is weaker actors  
Firm level studies Focus on organizations not individuals or 
networks. 
Exclusion  
Non-English language journals Language capability of authors 
Intra-organizational relationships, inter-
personal relationships or business to 
consumer relationships 
The study focused on firm level dyadic 
buyer-supplier relationships 
Natural Sciences, Computer Sciences and 
Engineering 
The discipline of study is Business and 
Management augmented by findings in other 
social science disciplines 
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Table 3: Number of papers allocated to each descriptive category  
Descriptive Category Sub Categories 
Number of 
papers 
Paper Type 
Analytical 
Conceptual 8 
Mathematical 1 
Statistical - 
Empirical 
Experimental Design - 
Statistical sampling 25 
Mixed Method 1 
Case Studies 13 
Literature Review - 
Studies over time 
Before 1990 - 
From 1990 till 1994 3 
From 1995 till 1999 4 
From 2000 till 2004 14 
From 2005 till 2009 15 
From 2010 till 2013 12 
Theoretical Lens 
Social Exchange Theory (SET) 15 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) 3 
Resource Dependence Theory (RDT) 3 
Resource Based View (RBV) 3 
Combination of SET, TCE, RDT, RBV 19 
Agency Theory 3 
Other 2 
Research Perspective 
Cross-sectional approach (Variance Study) 36 
Longitudinal study (Process Study) 3 
Geographical Location of 
study 
Europe 18 
N. America 14 
Other 7 
Industry Sector 
Manufacturing 27 
Service 8 
Both 4 
Research Methodology 
Quantitative 25 
Qualitative 13 
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Mixed Methods 1 
Dyadic Perspective 
Buyer 20 
Supplier 12 
Both 16 
Weaker Actor
1
 
Supplier 15 
Buyer 14 
Variable 12 
Both 8 
Organization Field 
Strategic Management 16 
Supply Chain Management 15 
Industrial Marketing 13 
Operations Management 4 
 
  
                                                 
1
 “Variable” indicates that an actor is in a weaker position in one relationship while simultaneously it is in a 
stronger position in another relationship.  
“Both” indicates that power dominance was examined from both perspectives (buyer/supplier) in the same 
article. 
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Table 4: Listing of papers contributing to strategic options or underpinning factors 
  Total Reviewed Papers** 
Options 
Collaboration 33 1,3,5,6-8,10-12,14-21,24,31-35,38-41,43-48   
Compromise 5 7,11,16,21,22 
Diversification 3 1,9,11 
Coalition 3 1,2,4 
Exit 9 9,11,24,26,28-30,36,37 
 Total* 53  
Factors 
Nature of interdependence 32 1-5,7-9,11-15,18-23,26-28,33-38,40-42,45  
Relationship governance 18 2,4,10,13,16,23-26,30-33,36,42,44,46,47  
Source of power 21 1-7,11,13-16,21-27,33,45  
Switching costs 17 1,3,5,10-16,19,28,30-32,36,38,43 
Type of conflict 29 1-9,14-18,21-26,36-41,46-48 
Relationship closeness 26 1,3,5,10-13,19-23,25-27,31-35,40-44,47 
Available alternatives 15 1,3,9,10,12,19,21,23,24,26,28,29,34,38,48 
 Total* 158  
* Indicates multiple options and factors discussed in the paper 
** See Appendix A for complete reference of the numbered articles 
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Figure 1: Summary Diagram of the Selection Process
Total Articles Selected 
for the Review 
(n = 48) 
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Articles from 
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Articles 
(n=5,463) 
Rejected 
Articles 
(n=4,192) 
Rejected 
Articles 
(n=509) 
Rejected 
Articles 
(n=34) 
n=10,223 n=4,760 n=568 n=82 n=48 
n=23 
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Figure 2: Weaker actor’s strategic options for counteracting a power dominance of a stronger actor in a buyer-supplier relationship 
Power dominance 
addressed within a dyad and 
relationship continues 
Power dominance 
addressed within a network 
and relationship continues 
Power dominance 
addressed within a dyad but 
relationship is terminated 
Strategic Options: 
- Dyadic collaboration 
- Compromise 
Strategic Options: 
- Network collaboration 
- Diversification 
- Coalition 
Strategic Options: 
- Exit 
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Figure 3: Factors underpinning the strategic options available to a weaker actor to counteract the dominance of a stronger actor in a buyer-
supplier relationship 
  
Underpinning Factors 
Dyadic Level 
- Nature of interdependence (dyadic) 
- Relationship governance 
- Sources of power 
- Switching costs 
- Type of conflict 
- Relationship closeness 
 
Network Level 
- Available alternatives 
- Nature of interdependence (network) 
 
Strategic Options 
Within a dyad - 
Relationship continues 
- Dyadic collaboration 
- Compromise  
Within a network - 
Relationship continues 
- Network collaboration 
- Diversification 
- Coalition 
Within a dyad - 
Relationship ends 
- Exit 
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Figure 4: Decision tree for weaker actors’ selection of strategic options in power asymmetric buyer-supplier relationships 
Continue 
relationship   
 
 Exit 
Discontinue 
relationship 
Continue 
relationship 
within a network 
Diversification  
Continue 
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Coalition 
Network 
Collaboration 
Compromise 
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Q2. Continue relationship 
within a dyad or a network?  
Q3a. Select strategic option 
within a network?  
Q3b. Select strategic 
option within a dyad?  
Q1. Continue or discontinue 
relationship?  
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